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1. Introduction
According
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
(Rome
 
Stat-
ute,
 
ICC
 
Statute),
 
States
 
can
 
accept
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
either
 
by
 
becoming
 
Par-
ties
 
to
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
or
 
by
 
lodging
 
a
 
“ declaration”
 
over
 
specific
 
crimes
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute. Article
 
12
(3)
 
further
 
provides
 
that
 
any
 
State
 
making
 
an
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declaration
 
“ shall
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
without
 
any
 
delay
 
or
 
exception
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
9”,〔 1 〕
 
whose
 
provisions
 
govern
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
international
 
cooperation
 
and
 
judicial
 
assistance
 
regime
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
investigations
 
or
 
prosecutions.
Since
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
entered
 
into
 
force
 
in
 
2002,
 
a
 
series
 
of
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declara-
tions
 
have
 
been
 
lodged
 
according
 
to
 
Article
 
12 ( 3):
 
from
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
in
 
2003
 
(confirmed
 
in
 
2010
 
and
 
2011),
 
from
 
Palestine
 
in
 
2009
 
and
 
2014,
 
from
 
Ukraine
 
in
 
2014
 
and
 
2015,
 
and
 
from
 
purported
 
representatives
 
of
 
Egypt
 
in
 
2013. In
 
response
 
to
 
the
 
latter
 
declaration,
 
lodged
 
by
 
representatives
 
of
 
the
 
ousted
 
Mohamed
 
Morsi
 
gov-
354
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Research
 
Associate,
 
Walther
 
Schücking
 
Institute
 
for
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Law,
 
University
 
of
 
Kiel
 
( email:
 
dbir-
kett@ wsi. uni-kiel. de) . By
 
way
 
of
 
disclosure,
 
the
 
author
 
served
 
as
 
Intern
 
to
 
Judge
 
Anita
 
Ušacka
 
in
 
the
 
Appeals
 
Division
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
she
 
presided
 
over
 
the
 
Judgment
 
on
 
the
 
appeal
 
of
 
Mr
 
Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo
 
against
 
the
 
decision
 
of
 
Pre - Trial
 
Chamber
 
I
 
on
 
jurisdiction
 
and
 
stay
 
of
 
the
 
proceed-
ings. This
 
chapter
 
was
 
completed
 
on
 
31
 
January
 
2018. The
 
websites
 
cited
 
herein
 
were
 
current
 
as
 
of
 
this
 
date.
Ome
 
Statute
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
(ICC
 
Statute),
 
2187
 
UNTS
 
90,
 
art. 12.
ernment
 
in
 
2013,
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
Office
 
of
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
( OTP)
 
referred
 
to
 
the
 
‘ legal
 
test
 
of
 
“effective
 
control” ’
 
in
 
determining
 
that
 
“the
 
applicants
 
did
 
not
 
exercise
 
ef-
fective
 
control
 
over
 
any
 
part
 
of
 
Egyptian
 
territory,
 
including
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
the
 
declara-
tion
 
was
 
signed. ” The
 
OTP
 
therefore
 
concluded
 
that
 
the
 
authority
 
that
 
lodged
 
the
 
declaration
 
was
 
not
 
capable
 
of
 
expressing
 
the
 
consent
 
of
 
Egypt
 
to
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
because
 
it
 
lacked
 
“ full
 
powers”,
 
citing
 
the
 
Vienna
 
Convention
 
on
 
the
 
Law
 
of
 
Treaties.
This
 
chapter
 
critically
 
analyses
 
the
 
law
 
and
 
practice
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
de-
clarations
 
lodged
 
pursuant
 
to
 
Article
 
12 (3). In
 
particular,
 
the
 
chapter
 
questions
 
the
 
application
 
of
 
the
 
“effective
 
control”
 
test
 
by
 
the
 
OTP
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
the
 
declaration
 
submitted
 
by
 
purported
 
representatives
 
of
 
Egypt
 
in
 
2013. The
 
chapter
 
argues
 
that
 
the
 
determination
 
of
 
the
 
OTP
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
 
must
 
be
 
limited
 
to
 
whether
 
the
 
applicant
 
is
 
able
 
to
 
exercise
 
“full
 
powers”
 
on
 
behalf
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
and
 
refrain
 
from
 
addressing
 
the
 
recognition
 
of
 
governments
 
under
 
international
 
law. However,
 
assuming
 
that
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
approach
 
in
 
response
 
to
 
the
 
Egypt
 
communi-
cation
 
could
 
be
 
followed
 
in
 
its
 
future
 
practice,
 
the
 
chapter
 
briefly
 
discusses
 
the
 
rele-
vance
 
of
 
the
 
requirement
 
that
 
accepting
 
States
 
“ shall
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court”
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute. The
 
chapter
 
argues
 
that
 
the
 
ability
 
to
 
pro-
vide
 
cooperation
 
is
 
critical
 
to
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
capacity
 
to
 
successfully
 
investigate
 
and
 
pros-
ecute
 
crimes
 
under
 
its
 
jurisdiction. The
 
chapter
 
concludes
 
that
 
scenarios
 
in
 
which
 
co-
operation,
 
and
 
indeed
 
“effective
 
control”,
 
might
 
be
 
absent
 
include
 
those
 
where
 
ac-
tion
 
by
 
the
 
Court
 
could
 
prove
 
most
 
crucial
 
in
 
ending
 
impunity
 
for
 
international
 
crimes. This,
 
in
 
turn,
 
provides
 
a
 
further
 
argument
 
in
 
support
 
of
 
the
 
OTP
 
limiting
 
its
 
determination
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
 
to
 
whether
 
the
 
applicant
 
pos-
sesses
 
“full
 
powers”.
2. (Preconditions
 
to
 
the)
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
Article
 
12
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
is
 
titled
 
“ Preconditions
 
to
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
juris-
454
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International
 
law
diction”. 〔 2 〕
 
According
 
to
 
Articles
 
12
 
and
 
13
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute,
 
only
 
a
 
State
 
or
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
Security
 
Council
 
( UNSC)
 
is
 
able
 
to
 
grant
 
jurisdiction
 
to
 
the
 
ICC. A
 
State
 
can
 
accept
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
either
 
by
 
becoming
 
a
 
State
 
Party
 
to
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
or
 
by
 
lodging
 
an
 
“ad
 
hoc
 
declaration”
 
over
 
particular
 
crimes
 
with
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute. Article
 
13
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
provide
 
as
 
follows:
The
 
Court
 
may
 
exercise
 
its
 
jurisdiction
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
a
 
crime
 
referred
 
to
 
in
 
article
 
5
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
the
 
provisions
 
of
 
this
 
Statute
 
if:
(a)
 
A
 
situation
 
in
 
which
 
one
 
or
 
more
 
of
 
such
 
crimes
 
appears
 
to
 
have
 
been
 
committed
 
is
 
referred
 
to
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
by
 
a
 
State
 
Party
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
arti-
cle
 
14;
(b)
 
A
 
situation
 
in
 
which
 
one
 
or
 
more
 
of
 
such
 
crimes
 
appears
 
to
 
have
 
been
 
committed
 
is
 
referred
 
to
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
by
 
the
 
Security
 
Council
 
acting
 
under
 
Chapter
 
VII
 
of
 
the
 
Charter
 
of
 
the
 
United
 
Nations;
 
or
(c)
 
The
 
Prosecutor
 
has
 
initiated
 
an
 
investigation
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
such
 
a
 
crime
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
article
 
15. 〔 3 〕
Although
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
may
 
initiate
 
an
 
investigation
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
the
 
crimes
 
under
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
subject-matter
 
jurisdiction
 
on
 
her
 
own
 
initiative
 
( or
 
proprio
 
mo-
tu),
 
this
 
power
 
is
 
subject
 
to
 
the
 
precondition
 
that
 
a
 
State
 
has
 
conferred
 
jurisdiction
 
to
 
the
 
Court
 
by
 
having
 
either
 
(i)
 
ratified
 
or
 
acceded
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute;
 
or
 
(ii)
 
sub-
mitted
 
an
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declaration. The
 
same
 
precondition
 
applies
 
where
 
a
 
State
 
Party
 
re-
fers
 
the
 
situation
 
to
 
the
 
Prosecutor. However,
 
this
 
precondition
 
need
 
not
 
be
 
met
 
if
 
the
 
situation
 
is
 
referred
 
to
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
by
 
the
 
UNSC. As
 
the
 
title
 
of
 
the
 
provision
 
sug-
gests,
 
it
 
is
 
Article
 
12
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
that
 
governs
 
these
 
preconditions.
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Ibid.
 
ICC
 
Statute,
 
above
 
n. 1,
 
art. 13.
2. 1
 
The
 
procedures
Article
 
12
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
provides
 
as
 
follows:
1. A
 
State
 
which
 
becomes
 
a
 
Party
 
to
 
this
 
Statute
 
thereby
 
accepts
 
the
 
juris-
diction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
crimes
 
referred
 
to
 
in
 
article
 
5.
2. In
 
the
 
case
 
of
 
article
 
13,
 
paragraph
 
(a)
 
or
 
(c),
 
the
 
Court
 
may
 
exercise
 
its
 
jurisdiction
 
if
 
one
 
or
 
more
 
of
 
the
 
following
 
States
 
are
 
Parties
 
to
 
this
 
Statute
 
or
 
have
 
accepted
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
paragraph
 
3:
(a)
 
The
 
State
 
on
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
which
 
the
 
conduct
 
in
 
question
 
occurred
 
or,
 
if
 
the
 
crime
 
was
 
committed
 
on
 
board
 
a
 
vessel
 
or
 
aircraft,
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
regis-
tration
 
of
 
that
 
vessel
 
or
 
aircraft;
(b)
 
The
 
State
 
of
 
which
 
the
 
person
 
accused
 
of
 
the
 
crime
 
is
 
a
 
national.
3. If
 
the
 
acceptance
 
of
 
a
 
State
 
which
 
is
 
not
 
a
 
Party
 
to
 
this
 
Statute
 
is
 
re-
quired
 
under
 
paragraph
 
2,
 
that
 
State
 
may,
 
by
 
declaration
 
lodged
 
with
 
the
 
Regis-
trar,
 
accept
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
Court
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
crime
 
in
 
question. The
 
accepting
 
State
 
shall
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
without
 
any
 
delay
 
or
 
exception
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
9. 〔 4 〕
Non-Party
 
States
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
may
 
thus
 
confer
 
limited
 
jurisdiction
 
to
 
the
 
ICC
 
by
 
lodging
 
a
 
declaration
 
with
 
the
 
Registrar
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. Such
 
a
 
declaration
 
may
 
also
 
serve
 
to
 
give
 
the
 
ICC
 
retroactive
 
jurisdiction. 〔 5 〕
 
The
 
ICC􀆳s
 
temporal
 
jurisdiction
 
is
 
limited
 
to
 
crimes
 
committed
 
after
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
enters
 
into
 
force
 
for
 
the
 
State
 
ratifying
 
or
 
acceding
 
thereto
 
unless
 
the
 
State
 
has
 
sub-
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ICC
 
Statute,
 
above
 
n. 1,
 
art. 12.
See
 
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Judgment
 
on
 
the
 
appeal
 
of
 
Mr
 
Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo
 
a-
gainst
 
thedecision
 
of
 
Pre-Trial
 
Chamber
 
I
 
on
 
jurisdiction
 
and
 
stay
 
of
 
the
 
proceedings,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 11-321
 
(12
 
Dec. 2012)
 
(Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Appeal
 
Judgment),
 
paras. 83-84.
mitted
 
an
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declaration
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12
(3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. 〔 6 〕
It
 
is
 
noteworthy
 
that
 
submitting
 
an
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declaration
 
leads
 
to
 
the
 
assumption
 
of
 
certain
 
obligations
 
on
 
the
 
part
 
of
 
the
 
“ lodging
 
State”. Upon
 
lodging
 
a
 
declaration
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3),
 
the
 
“lodging
 
State”
 
is
 
obligated
 
to
 
immediately
 
and
 
fully
 
co-
operate
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute.
2. 2
 
The
 
practice
Since
 
the
 
entry
 
into
 
force
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute,
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
has
 
received
 
a
 
series
 
of
 
declarations
 
lodged
 
pursuant
 
to
 
Article
 
12 ( 3):
 
from
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
in
 
2003
 
(confirmed
 
in
 
2010
 
and
 
again
 
in
 
2011);
 
from
 
Palestine
 
in
 
2009
 
and
 
2014;
 
from
 
Ukraine
 
in
 
2014
 
and
 
2015;
 
and
 
from
 
purported
 
representatives
 
of
 
Egypt
 
in
 
2013. In
 
all
 
four
 
lodging
 
States,
 
it
 
could
 
be
 
argued
 
that
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
the
 
ter-
ritory
 
on
 
which
 
certain
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
took
 
place
 
was
 
at
 
issue,
 
if
 
not
 
explicitly
 
dispu-
ted,
 
during
 
the
 
lodging
 
process. However,
 
only
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
declaration
 
lodged
 
by
 
self-professed
 
representatives
 
of
 
the
 
Arab
 
Republic
 
of
 
Egypt
 
was
 
this
 
factor
 
taken
 
into
 
consideration
 
by
 
any
 
organ
 
of
 
the
 
ICC. The
 
following
 
section
 
critically
 
analyses
 
the
 
practice
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
the
 
foregoing
 
four
 
declarations
 
(and
 
confirma-
tions)
 
lodged
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute.
(1)
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
On
 
18
 
April
 
2003,
 
the
 
then
 
Minister
 
of
 
Foreign
 
Affairs
 
of
 
the
 
Republic
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
Mr
 
Mamadou
 
Bamba,
 
lodged
 
the
 
following
 
declaration
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar:
Pursuant
 
to
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Statute
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court,
 
the
 
Government
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
accepts
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
for
 
the
 
purposes
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Statute,
 
above
 
n. 1,
 
art. 11
 
(“1. The
 
Court
 
has
 
jurisdiction
 
only
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
crimes
 
commit-
ted
 
after
 
the
 
entry
 
into
 
force
 
of
 
this
 
Statute. 2. If
 
a
 
State
 
becomes
 
a
 
Party
 
to
 
this
 
Statute
 
after
 
its
 
entry
 
into
 
force,
 
the
 
Court
 
may
 
exercise
 
its
 
jurisdiction
 
only
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
crimes
 
committed
 
after
 
the
 
entry
 
into
 
force
 
of
 
this
 
Stat-
ute
 
for
 
that
 
State,
 
unless
 
that
 
State
 
has
 
made
 
a
 
declaration
 
under
 
article
 
12,
 
paragraph
 
3. ”) .
of
 
identifying,
 
investigating
 
and
 
trying
 
the
 
perpetrators
 
and
 
accomplices
 
of
 
acts
 
com-
mitted
 
on
 
Ivorian
 
territory
 
since
 
the
 
events
 
of
 
19
 
September
 
2002.
Accordingly,
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
undertakes
 
to
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
without
 
delay
 
or
 
exception
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
Statute. This
 
declaration
 
shall
 
be
 
valid
 
for
 
an
 
unspecified
 
period
 
of
 
time
 
and
 
shall
 
enter
 
into
 
effect
 
on
 
being
 
signed. 〔 7 〕
This
 
declaration
 
was
 
submitted
 
to
 
the
 
ICC
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
when
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
was
 
under
 
the
 
administration
 
of
 
a
 
“government
 
of
 
national
 
reconciliation”
 
pursuant
 
to
 
the
 
terms
 
of
 
the
 
Linas-Marcoussis
 
Agreement
 
of
 
24
 
January
 
2003. 〔 8 〕
 
It
 
was
 
Mr
 
Laurent
 
Gbagbo
 
who
 
led
 
this
 
administration
 
until
 
disputed
 
presidential
 
elections
 
took
 
place
 
in
 
late
 
2010. Both
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
and
 
his
 
opponent,
 
Mr
 
Alessane
 
Ouattara,
 
claimed
 
victo-
ry,
 
with
 
the
 
Independent
 
Electoral
 
Commission
 
announcing
 
Mr
 
Ouattara
 
the
 
victor
 
on
 
2
 
December
 
2010
 
and
 
the
 
Constitutional
 
Council
 
declaring
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
the
 
winner
 
on
 
the
 
following
 
day. 〔 9 〕
 
It
 
was
 
in
 
this
 
context
 
that
 
Mr
 
Ouattara,
 
on
 
14
 
December
 
2010,
 
sent
 
three
 
near-identical
 
letters
 
to
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
President,
 
Prosecutor,
 
and
 
Registrar,
 
in
 
which
 
he
 
confirmed
 
the
 
declaration
 
lodged
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Stat-
ute
 
by
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
on
 
18
 
April
 
2003. 〔10〕
 
Mr
 
Ouattara
 
sent
 
a
 
further
 
letter
 
confir-
ming
 
the
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declaration
 
on
 
3
 
May
 
2011. 〔11〕
 
On
 
4
 
May
 
2011,
 
the
 
Con-
stitutional
 
Council,
 
which
 
had
 
previously
 
declared
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
the
 
victor,
 
confirmed
 
Mr
 
Ouattara
 
as
 
the
 
President
 
of
 
Côte
 
d􀆳Ivoire,
 
declaring
 
valid
 
the
 
decisions
 
he
 
had
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Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Declaration
 
Accepting
 
the
 
Jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
dated
 
18
 
April
 
2003,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 11-129-Anx16-tENG
 
(6
 
Sep. 2012) .
Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Appeal
 
Judgment,
 
above
 
n. 5,
 
paras. 48-49. For
 
the
 
text
 
of
 
the
 
Linas-Marcous-
sis
 
Agreement,
 
see
 
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Linas
 
Marcoussis
 
Agreement
 
of
 
24
 
January
 
2003,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 11-129-Anx17-tENG
 
(11
 
Oct. 2012) .
Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Appeal
 
Judgment,
 
above
 
n. 5,
 
paras. 53-54.
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Letter
 
from
 
Alassane
 
Ouattara
 
to
 
the
 
President
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
da-
ted
 
14
 
December
 
2010,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 11-129-Anx14-tENG
 
(9
 
Oct. 2012) .
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Letter
 
from
 
Alassane
 
Ouattara
 
to
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
da-
ted
 
3
 
May
 
2011,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 11-129-Anx15-tENG
 
(10
 
Oct. 2012) .
previously
 
taken
 
in
 
this
 
capacity. 〔12〕
On
 
3
 
October
 
2011,
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Pre - Trial
 
Chamber
 
III
 
authorised
 
the
 
com-
mencement
 
of
 
an
 
investigation
 
into
 
the
 
Situation
 
in
 
the
 
Republic
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire. 〔13〕
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
filed
 
a
 
challenge
 
to
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
on
 
29
 
May
 
2012,〔14〕
 
in
 
which
 
he
 
argued,
 
inter
 
alia,
 
as
 
follows
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
letters
 
of
 
2
 
December
 
2010:
Article
 
12 (3)
 
is
 
clear:
 
only
 
a
 
“State”
 
can
 
make
 
a
 
declaration
 
accepting
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court. For
 
such
 
a
 
declaration
 
to
 
have
 
any
 
legal
 
effect,
 
it
 
must
 
be
 
made
 
by
 
an
 
organ
 
or
 
person
 
competent
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
State. In
 
this
 
re-
spect,
 
there
 
is
 
no
 
doubt
 
that
 
a
 
Head
 
of
 
State
 
is
 
endowed
 
with
 
such
 
capacity.
[􀆺]
 
The
 
Defence
 
argues,
 
however
 
that
 
Alassane
 
Ouattara
 
could
 
not
 
be
 
considered
 
the
 
legitimate
 
Head
 
of
 
State
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
of
 
writing
 
the
 
said
 
letter. The
 
Defence
 
submits
 
that,
 
if
 
the
 
authority
 
of
 
a
 
State
 
representative
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
State
 
internationally
 
and
 
hence
 
vis-à-vis
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
is
 
in
 
dis-
pute,
 
the
 
utmost
 
attention
 
must
 
be
 
paid
 
to
 
the
 
legality
 
of
 
the
 
act
 
under
 
domestic
 
law,
 
particularly
 
the
 
Constitution. An
 
international
 
organ
 
such
 
as
 
the
 
Court
 
can-
not
 
vest
 
with
 
legal
 
effect
 
within
 
the
 
meaning
 
of
 
its
 
Statute
 
an
 
act
 
emanating
 
from
 
a
 
person
 
who
 
is
 
not
 
de
 
facto
 
and
 
de
 
jure
 
empowered
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
State.
[􀆺]
 
Accordingly,
 
the
 
Defence
 
simply
 
moves
 
the
 
Chamber
 
to
 
find
 
that
 
at
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Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Appeal
 
Judgment,
 
above
 
n. 5,
 
para. 57. For
 
the
 
Decision,
 
see
 
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Decision
 
of
 
the
 
Constitutional
 
Council
 
No. CI-2011-EP - 036 / 04- 05 / CC / SG
 
pro-
claiming
 
Alassane
 
Ouattara
 
President
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
ICC-02 / 11-01 / 1
 
l-129-Anx3-tENG
 
(18
 
Sep. 2009) .
Situation
 
in
 
the
 
Republic
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
Decision
 
Pursuant
 
to
 
Article
 
15
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
on
 
the
 
Authorisation
 
of
 
an
 
Investigation
 
into
 
the
 
Situation
 
in
 
the
 
Republic
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
ICC - 02 / 11 - 14
 
( 3
 
Oct. 2011) .
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Corrigendum
 
of
 
the
 
challenge
 
to
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Inter-
national
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
on
 
the
 
basis
 
of
 
articles
 
12 (3),
 
19 (2),
 
21 (3),
 
55
 
and
 
59
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
filed
 
by
 
the
 
Defence
 
for
 
President
 
Gbagbo
 
(ICC- 02 / 11- 01 / 11- 129),
 
ICC- 02 / 11- 01 / 11- 129-Corr-tENG
 
( 29
 
May
 
2012)
 
(Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Challenge) .
the
 
time
 
of
 
writing
 
the
 
14
 
December
 
2010
 
letter,
 
Alassane
 
Ouattara
 
was
 
not
 
de
 
facto
 
and
 
de
 
jure
 
President
 
of
 
the
 
country
 
within
 
the
 
meaning
 
of
 
the
 
Ivorian
 
con-
stitution. 〔15〕
As
 
to
 
the
 
letter
 
of
 
3
 
May
 
2011,
 
the
 
Defence
 
for
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
asked
 
the
 
Court
 
to
 
disregard
 
it
 
based
 
in
 
part
 
on
 
“ Mr
 
Ouattara􀆳s
 
lack
 
of
 
official
 
capacity
 
on
 
3
 
May
 
2011”,〔16〕
 
which
 
the
 
Defence
 
argued
 
deprived
 
the
 
letter
 
of
 
“any
 
legal
 
effect” . 〔17〕
On
 
15
 
August
 
2012,
 
ICC
 
Pre-Trial
 
Chamber
 
I
 
dismissed
 
the
 
Defence􀆳s
 
chal-
lenge
 
to
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction,〔18〕
 
finding
 
it
 
“unnecessary
 
to
 
address
 
the
 
validity
 
of
 
the
 
letters
 
of
 
14
 
December
 
2010
 
and
 
3
 
May
 
2011
 
or
 
the
 
question
 
of
 
the
 
capacity
 
of
 
Mr
 
Ouattara
 
to
 
bind
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
on
 
those
 
particular
 
dates. ” 〔19〕
 
In
 
short,
 
the
 
Pre-
Trial
 
Chamber
 
found
 
that
 
the
 
ICC
 
had
 
jurisdiction
 
over
 
all
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
committed
 
since
 
19
 
September
 
2002
 
based
 
on
 
the
 
declaration
 
of
 
18
 
April
 
2003. 〔20〕
 
Notably,
 
however,
 
Pre-Trial
 
Chamber
 
I
 
opined
 
as
 
follows
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
subsequent
 
let-
ters
 
confirming
 
the
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declaration:
[ 􀆺]
 
while
 
not
 
necessary
 
from
 
a
 
legal
 
point
 
of
 
view,
 
these
 
letters,
 
together
 
with
 
the
 
subsequent
 
statements
 
and
 
continuous
 
cooperation
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
with
 
the
 
Court,
 
are
 
further
 
evidence
 
that
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire
 
has
 
accepted
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
the
 
situation [. ] 〔21〕
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〔16〕
〔17〕
〔18〕
〔19〕
〔20〕
〔21〕
Ibid.,
 
paras. 93-94,
 
98
 
(footnotes
 
omitted) . 　
Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Challenge,
 
above
 
n. 14,
 
para. 101.
Ibid.
 
Prosecutor
 
v. Laurent
 
Koudou
 
Gbagbo,
 
Decision
 
on
 
the
 
“Corrigendum
 
of
 
the
 
challenge
 
to
 
the
 
jurisdic-
tion
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
on
 
the
 
basis
 
of
 
articles
 
12 (3),
 
19 (2),
 
21 (3),
 
55
 
and
 
59
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
filed
 
by
 
the
 
Defence
 
for
 
President
 
Gbagbo
 
( ICC-02 / 11- 01 / 11- 129) ”,
 
ICC- 02 / 11- 01 / 11-
212
 
(15
 
Aug. 2012)
 
(Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Decision) .
Ibid.,
 
para. 66.
Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Decision,
 
above
 
n. 14,
 
para. 65.
Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Decision,
 
above
 
n. 14,
 
para. 66.
The
 
Appeals
 
Chamber
 
did
 
not
 
address
 
Pre-Trial
 
Chamber
 
I􀆳s
 
finding,
 
which
 
it
 
found
 
to
 
be
 
obiter
 
dicta,
 
on
 
appeal. 〔22〕
 
At
 
no
 
stage
 
of
 
the
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declaration
 
process
 
did
 
any
 
organ
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
make
 
a
 
determination
 
as
 
to
 
whether
 
Mr
 
Gbagbo
 
or
 
Mr
 
Ouattara
 
exercised
 
“effective
 
control”
 
over
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
despite
 
the
 
supposedly
 
disputed
 
status
 
of
 
the
 
presidency
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
the
 
letters
 
of
 
14
 
Decem-
ber
 
2010
 
and
 
3
 
May
 
2011
 
were
 
sent. The
 
Court
 
avoided
 
this
 
issue
 
by
 
focusing
 
on
 
the
 
earlier
 
declaration.
(2)
 
Palestine〔23〕
On
 
21
 
January
 
2009,
 
Mr
 
Ali
 
Khashan,
 
the
 
then
 
Minister
 
of
 
Justice
 
of
 
the
 
Gov-
ernment
 
of
 
Palestine,
 
submitted
 
a
 
declaration
 
to
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
Registrar,
 
which
 
provides
 
as
 
follows,
 
in
 
relevant
 
part:
In
 
conformity
 
with
 
Article
 
12,
 
paragraph
 
3
 
of
 
the
 
Statute
 
of
 
the
 
Internation-
al
 
Criminal
 
Court,
 
the
 
Government
 
of
 
Palestine
 
hereby
 
recognizes
 
the
 
jurisdic-
tion
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
identifying,
 
prosecuting
 
and
 
judging
 
the
 
au-
thors
 
and
 
accomplices
 
of
 
acts
 
committed
 
on
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
Palestine
 
since
 
1
 
July
 
2002.
As
 
a
 
consequence,
 
the
 
Government
 
of
 
Palestine
 
will
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
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Gbagbo
 
Jurisdiction
 
Appeal
 
Judgment,
 
above
 
n. 5,
 
paras. 91-92.
For
 
an
 
engaging
 
debate
 
concerning
 
the
 
relationship
 
between
 
Palestine
 
and
 
the
 
ICC,
 
including
 
discus-
sion
 
of
 
its
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations,
 
see,
 
inter
 
alia,
 
Yaël
 
Ronen,
 
ICC
 
Jurisdiction
 
over
 
Acts
 
Committed
 
in
 
the
 
Gaza
 
Strip:
 
Art. 12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
and
 
Non-state
 
Entities,
 
8
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
( 2010),
 
3;
 
Yuval
 
Shany,
 
In
 
Defence
 
of
 
Functional
 
Interpretation
 
of
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute:
 
A
 
Re-
sponse
 
to
 
Yaël
 
Ronen,
 
8
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2010),
 
329;
 
Alain
 
Pellet,
 
The
 
Palestinian
 
Declaration
 
and
 
the
 
Jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court,
 
8
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2010)
 
981;
 
Malcolm
 
N
 
Shaw
 
QC,
 
The
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
Declaration
 
of
 
the
 
Palestinian
 
Authority,
 
the
 
Interna-
tional
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
and
 
International
 
Law,
 
9
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2011),
 
301;
 
Andreas
 
Zimmermann,
 
Palestine
 
and
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
Quo
 
Vadis?
 
Reach
 
and
 
Limits
 
of
 
Declarations
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3),
 
11
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2013),
 
303;
 
Eugene
 
Kontorovich,
 
Israel / Pales-
tine-The
 
ICC􀆳s
 
Uncharted
 
Territory,
 
11
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2013),
 
979;
 
Yaël
 
Ronen,
 
Is-
rael,
 
Palestine
 
and
 
the
 
ICC-Territory
 
Uncharted
 
but
 
Not
 
Unknown,
 
12
 
Journal
 
of
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Justice
 
(2014),
 
7.
Court
 
without
 
delay
 
or
 
exception,
 
in
 
conformity
 
with
 
Chapter
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
Statute.
This
 
declaration,
 
made
 
for
 
an
 
indeterminate
 
duration,
 
will
 
enter
 
into
 
force
 
upon
 
its
 
signature. Material
 
supplementary
 
to
 
and
 
supporting
 
this
 
declaration
 
will
 
be
 
pro-
vided
 
shortly
 
in
 
a
 
separate
 
communication. 〔24〕
On
 
3
 
April
 
2012,
 
after
 
having
 
initiated
 
a
 
preliminary
 
examination
 
in
 
order
 
to
 
determine
 
whether
 
there
 
was
 
a
 
reasonable
 
basis
 
to
 
proceed
 
with
 
an
 
investigation,
 
the
 
Office
 
of
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
(OTP)
 
determined
 
that
 
the
 
preconditions
 
to
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
under
 
Article
 
12
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
had
 
not
 
been
 
met. 〔25〕
 
The
 
OTP
 
reasoned
 
as
 
follows:
[􀆺]
 
competence
 
for
 
determining
 
the
 
term
 
“ State”
 
within
 
the
 
meaning
 
of
 
article
 
12
 
rests,
 
in
 
the
 
first
 
instance,
 
with
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
Secretary
 
General
 
who,
 
in
 
case
 
of
 
doubt,
 
will
 
defer
 
to
 
the
 
guidance
 
of
 
General
 
Assembly. The
 
As-
sembly
 
of
 
States
 
Parties
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
could
 
also
 
in
 
due
 
course
 
decide
 
to
 
address
 
the
 
matter
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
article
 
112 (2)(g)
 
of
 
the
 
Statute.
[􀆺]
 
In
 
interpreting
 
and
 
applying
 
article
 
12
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute,
 
the
 
Of-
fice
 
has
 
assessed
 
that
 
it
 
is
 
for
 
the
 
relevant
 
bodies
 
at
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
or
 
the
 
Assembly
 
of
 
States
 
Parties
 
to
 
make
 
the
 
legal
 
determination
 
whether
 
Palestine
 
qualifies
 
as
 
a
 
State
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
acceding
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
and
 
thereby
 
enabling
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
Court
 
under
 
article
 
12 (1). The
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
provides
 
no
 
authority
 
for
 
the
 
Office
 
of
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
to
 
adopt
 
a
 
method
 
to
 
define
 
the
 
term
 
“State”
 
under
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
which
 
would
 
be
 
at
 
vari-
ance
 
with
 
that
 
established
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
article
 
12 (1). 〔26〕
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Declaration
 
recognizing
 
the
 
Jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
( 21
 
Jan. 2009 )
 
(www. legal-tools. org / doc / d9b1c6 / ) .
Office
 
of
 
the
 
Prosecutor,
 
Situation
 
in
 
Palestine
 
(3
 
Apr. 2012)
 
(www. legal-tools. org / doc / f5d6d7 / )
 
(OTP
 
Palestine
 
Determination) .
Ibid.,
 
paras. 5-6.
The
 
OTP
 
did,
 
however,
 
explicitly
 
accept
 
the
 
possibility
 
that
 
it
 
could,
 
in
 
future,
 
consider
 
allegations
 
of
 
crimes
 
within
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
committed
 
in
 
Palestine,
 
should
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
or
 
the
 
Assembly
 
of
 
States
 
Parties
 
“resolve
 
the
 
legal
 
issue”
 
or
 
should
 
the
 
Security
 
Council
 
confer
 
it
 
with
 
jurisdiction
 
under
 
Article
 
13
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. 〔27〕
On
 
1
 
January
 
2015,
 
Palestine
 
tendered
 
a
 
second
 
declaration
 
recognising
 
the
 
ju-
risdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute,
 
there-
by
 
affording
 
the
 
OTP
 
the
 
opportunity
 
to
 
further
 
consider
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
under
 
the
 
ju-
risdiction
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
committed
 
on
 
its
 
territory. 〔28〕
 
The
 
second
 
Palestinian
 
declara-
tion
 
was
 
signed
 
and
 
lodged
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
by
 
Palestinian
 
President,
 
Mr
 
Mahmoud
 
Abbas. 〔29〕
 
Worded
 
in
 
similar
 
terms
 
to
 
its
 
earier
 
declaration,
 
Palestine
 
recognised
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
over
 
alleged
 
international
 
crimes
 
“ committed
 
in
 
the
 
occupied
 
Palestinian
 
territory,
 
including
 
East
 
Jerusalem,
 
since
 
June
 
13,
 
2014. ” 〔30〕
 
As
 
with
 
the
 
first
 
declaration,
 
Palestine
 
agreed
 
to
 
cooperate
 
immediately
 
and
 
fully
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
under
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
and
 
stated
 
that
 
the
 
decla-
ration
 
was
 
valid
 
upon
 
signature
 
for
 
an
 
unspecified
 
period
 
of
 
time. 〔31〕
 
Notably,
 
Pales-
tine
 
then
 
acceded
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
on
 
2
 
January
 
2015,
 
with
 
the
 
treaty
 
entering
 
in-
to
 
force
 
for
 
Palestine
 
on
 
1
 
April
 
2015. 〔32〕
On
 
this
 
occasion,
 
the
 
OTP
 
determined
 
that
 
Palestine􀆳s
 
status
 
before
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
rendered
 
it
 
competent
 
to
 
lodge
 
a
 
declaration
 
under
 
Article
 
12 ( 3)
 
of
 
the
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〔31〕
〔32〕
OTP
 
Palestine
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 25,
 
para. 8.
Declaration
 
Accepting
 
the
 
Jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
( 31
 
December
 
2014)
 
(www. legal-tools. org / doc / 60aff8 / )
 
(2015
 
Palestine
 
Declaration) .
Ibid.
 
2015
 
Palestine
 
Declaration,
 
above
 
n. 28.
Ibid.
 
OTP,
 
Report
 
on
 
Preliminary
 
Examination
 
Activities
 
( 2015 )
 
( 12
 
Nov. 2015 )
 
( www. legal -
tools. org / doc / ac0ed2 / )
 
(2015
 
OTP
 
Report),
 
para. 45.
Rome
 
Statute. 〔33〕
 
The
 
OTP
 
reasoned,
 
in
 
relevant
 
part,
 
as
 
follows:
The
 
Office
 
considers
 
that,
 
since
 
Palestine
 
was
 
granted
 
observer
 
State
 
status
 
in
 
the
 
UN
 
by
 
the
 
UNGA,
 
it
 
must
 
be
 
considered
 
a
 
“ State”
 
for
 
the
 
purposes
 
of
 
accession
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
( in
 
accordance
 
with
 
the
 
“ all
 
States”
 
formula).
Additionally,
 
as
 
the
 
Office
 
has
 
previously
 
stated
 
publicly,
 
the
 
term
 
“State”
 
em-
ployed
 
in
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
should
 
be
 
interpreted
 
in
 
the
 
same
 
manner
 
as
 
the
 
term
 
“ State”
 
used
 
in
 
article
 
12 (1). Thus,
 
a
 
State
 
that
 
may
 
accede
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
may
 
also
 
lodge
 
a
 
declaration
 
under
 
article
 
12 (3).
[ 􀆺]
 
For
 
the
 
Office,
 
the
 
focus
 
of
 
the
 
inquiry
 
into
 
Palestine􀆳s
 
ability
 
to
 
accede
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
has
 
consistently
 
been
 
the
 
question
 
of
 
Palestine􀆳s
 
status
 
at
 
the
 
UN. The
 
UNGA
 
Resolution
 
67 / 19
 
[ granting
 
Palestine
 
“ non -member
 
observer
 
State”
 
status
 
in
 
the
 
UN]
 
is
 
therefore
 
determinative
 
of
 
Palestine􀆳s
 
ability
 
to
 
ac-
cede
 
to
 
the
 
Statute
 
pursuant
 
to
 
article
 
125,
 
and
 
equally,
 
its
 
ability
 
to
 
lodge
 
an
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
declaration. 〔34〕
As
 
with
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
again
 
the
 
OTP
 
did
 
not
 
enter
 
into
 
an
 
analysis
 
of
 
‘effective
 
control’
 
over
 
the
 
territory
 
on
 
which
 
the
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
under
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
took
 
place. Instead,
 
the
 
OTP
 
refrained
 
from
 
undertaking
 
such
 
an
 
analysis
 
and,
 
as
 
is
 
argued,
 
properly
 
limited
 
its
 
assessment
 
to
 
the
 
question
 
of
 
statehood
 
as
 
determined
 
by
 
the
 
United
 
Nations.
(3)
 
Ukraine〔35〕
Ukraine
 
has
 
also
 
lodged
 
two
 
declarations
 
with
 
the
 
Registrar
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
accep-
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〔35〕
Ibid.,
 
paras. 52-53.
2015
 
OTP
 
Report,
 
above
 
n. 32,
 
paras. 52-53.
For
 
an
 
excellent
 
analysis
 
of
 
Ukraine􀆳s
 
relationship
 
with
 
the
 
ICC,
 
including
 
declarations
 
lodged
 
thereby
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute,
 
see
 
Iryna
 
Marchuk,
 
Ukraine
 
and
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court:
 
Implications
 
of
 
the
 
Ad
 
Hoc
 
Jurisdiction
 
Acceptance
 
and
 
Beyond,
 
49
 
Vanderbilt
 
Journal
 
of
 
Transnational
 
Law
 
(2016),
 
323.
ting
 
ICC
 
jurisdiction
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. On
 
9
 
A-
pril
 
2014,
 
the
 
Embassy
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
to
 
the
 
Kingdom
 
of
 
the
 
Netherlands
 
notified
 
the
 
ICC
 
Registrar
 
that
 
such
 
a
 
declaration,
 
made
 
by
 
the
 
Parliament
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
(Verkhov-
na
 
Rada),〔36〕
 
had
 
entered
 
into
 
force
 
on
 
25
 
February
 
2014. 〔37〕
 
According
 
to
 
the
 
am-
bassadorial
 
communiqué,
 
by
 
this
 
declaration,
 
“Ukraine
 
hereby
 
recognizes
 
the
 
juris-
diction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
identifying,
 
prosecuting
 
and
 
judging
 
the
 
au-
thors
 
and
 
accomplices
 
of
 
acts
 
committed
 
on
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
within
 
the
 
period
 
21
 
November
 
2013-22
 
February
 
2014. ” 〔38〕
On
 
8
 
September
 
2015,
 
the
 
Minister
 
for
 
Foreign
 
Affairs
 
of
 
Ukraine,
 
Mr
 
Pavlo
 
Klimkin,
 
informed
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
that
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
had
 
a-
dopted
 
a
 
second
 
Resolution,
 
on
 
4
 
February
 
2017,
 
granting
 
jurisdiction
 
to
 
the
 
Court
 
under
 
the
 
auspices
 
of
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. 〔39〕
 
In
 
accordance
 
with
 
the
 
second
 
declaration,
 
Ukraine
 
recognised
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court
 
“for
 
the
 
pur-
pose
 
of
 
identifying,
 
prosecuting
 
and
 
judging
 
the
 
perpetrators
 
and
 
accomplices
 
of
 
acts
 
committed
 
in
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
since
 
20
 
February
 
2014. ” 〔40〕
 
The
 
second
 
de-
claration
 
therefore
 
served
 
to
 
extend
 
the
 
ICC􀆳s
 
temporal
 
jurisdiction
 
over
 
alleged
 
inter-
national
 
crimes
 
committed
 
in
 
Ukraine
 
as
 
the
 
first
 
declaration
 
was
 
confined
 
to
 
a
 
limit-
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Declaration
 
of
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
to
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
on
 
the
 
recognition
 
of
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
International
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
by
 
Ukraine
 
over
 
crimes
 
against
 
humanity,
 
committed
 
by
 
senior
 
officials
 
of
 
the
 
state,
 
which
 
led
 
to
 
extremely
 
grave
 
consequences
 
and
 
mass
 
murder
 
of
 
Ukrainian
 
nationals
 
during
 
peaceful
 
protests
 
within
 
the
 
period
 
21
 
November
 
2013 - 22
 
February
 
2014
 
( 25
 
February
 
2014)
 
( www. legal -
tools. org / doc / 1a65fa / )
 
(2014
 
Ukraine
 
Declaration) .
Embassy
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
to
 
the
 
Kingdom
 
of
 
the
 
Netherlands,
 
Letter
 
dated
 
9
 
April
 
2014
 
(9
 
April
 
2014)
 
(www. legal-tools. org / doc / eec0cf / ) .
Ibid.
 
Declaration
 
of
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
on
 
the
 
recognition
 
of
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Internation-
al
 
Criminal
 
Court
 
by
 
Ukraine
 
over
 
crimes
 
against
 
humanity
 
and
 
war
 
crimes
 
committed
 
by
 
senior
 
officials
 
of
 
the
 
Russian
 
Federation
 
and
 
leaders
 
of
 
terrorist
 
organizations
 
“DNR”
 
and
 
“LNR,”
 
which
 
led
 
to
 
extremely
 
grave
 
con-
sequences
 
and
 
mass
 
murder
 
of
 
Ukrainian
 
nationals
 
(4
 
February
 
2015)
 
( www. legal- tools. org / doc / b53005 / )
 
(2015
 
Ukraine
 
Declaration) .
Ibid.
 
ed
 
period
 
(21
 
November
 
2013-22
 
February
 
2014). 〔41〕
 
The
 
reason
 
for
 
the
 
second
 
declaration
 
was
 
explained
 
in
 
the
 
Declaration
 
of
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada,
 
which
 
is
 
appen-
ded
 
to
 
the
 
communiqué. 〔42〕
 
According
 
to
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada:
Starting
 
from
 
20
 
February
 
2014
 
there
 
is
 
an
 
ongoing
 
Russian
 
Federation􀆳s
 
and
 
Russia
 
supported
 
militant - terrorists ’
 
armed
 
aggression
 
against
 
Ukraine,
 
during
 
which
 
a
 
part
 
of
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
an
 
independent
 
and
 
sovereign
 
state
 
of
 
Ukraine -the
 
Autonomous
 
Republic
 
of
 
Crimea
 
and
 
the
 
city
 
of
 
Sevastopol -was
 
annexed,
 
parts
 
of
 
Donetsk
 
and
 
Luhansk
 
regions
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
were
 
occupied,
 
thousands
 
of
 
Ukrainian
 
na-
tionals,
 
including
 
children,
 
were
 
killed,
 
thousands
 
of
 
people
 
were
 
injured,
 
the
 
infra-
structure
 
of
 
the
 
whole
 
region
 
was
 
destroyed
 
and
 
hundreds
 
of
 
thousands
 
of
 
people
 
were
 
forced
 
to
 
flee
 
from
 
their
 
homes. 〔43〕
Unlike
 
the
 
2014
 
declaration,
 
the
 
2015
 
Ukrainian
 
declaration
 
was
 
made
 
for
 
an
 
indefinite
 
period
 
of
 
time. As
 
with
 
the
 
first,
 
Ukraine
 
confirmed
 
its
 
obligation
 
to
 
coop-
erate
 
with
 
the
 
Court
 
under
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
in
 
its
 
second
 
declaration
 
un-
der
 
Article
 
12 (3). 〔44〕
The
 
analysis
 
conducted
 
by
 
the
 
OTP
 
as
 
to
 
the
 
capacity
 
of
 
the
 
individuals
 
who
 
lodged
 
the
 
first
 
and
 
second
 
declarations
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
was
 
brief
 
and
 
un-
controversial:
Ukraine
 
is
 
not
 
a
 
State
 
Party
 
to
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. However,
 
pursuant
 
to
 
the
 
two
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
 
lodged
 
by
 
the
 
Government
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
on
 
17
 
April
 
2014
 
and
 
8
 
September
 
2015,
 
respectively,
 
the
 
Court
 
may
 
exercise
 
jurisdiction
 
over
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
crimes
 
committed
 
on
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
from
 
21
 
November
 
2013
 
on-
wards. Ukraine􀆳s
 
acceptance
 
of
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
ICC
 
was
 
made,
 
in
 
both
 
cases,
 
on
 
the
 
basis
 
of
 
declarations
 
of
 
the
 
Verkhovna
 
Rada
 
of
 
Ukraine
 
(the
 
Par-
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〔44〕
2014
 
Ukraine
 
Declaration,
 
above
 
n. 36. See
 
also
 
2015
 
OTP
 
Report,
 
above
 
n. 32,
 
paras. 107-108.
2015
 
Ukraine
 
Declaration,
 
above
 
n. 39.
Ibid.
 
2015
 
Ukraine
 
Declaration,
 
above
 
n. 39.
liament
 
of
 
Ukraine),
 
urging
 
acceptance
 
of
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
Court
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
crimes
 
allegedly
 
committed
 
during
 
the
 
relevant
 
periods. 〔45〕
Thus,
 
although
 
the
 
territory
 
on
 
which
 
some
 
of
 
the
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
under
 
ICC
 
ju-
risdiction
 
occurred
 
was
 
arguably
 
beyond
 
Ukraine􀆳s
 
effective
 
control
 
( to
 
a
 
lesser
 
or
 
greater
 
extent,
 
the
 
Autonomous
 
Republic
 
of
 
Crimea
 
and
 
parts
 
of
 
the
 
Donetsk
 
and
 
Lu-
hansk
 
regions)
 
on
 
the
 
dates
 
on
 
which
 
the
 
declarations
 
were
 
lodged,
 
there
 
was
 
no
 
dis-
pute
 
as
 
to
 
the
 
capacity
 
of
 
the
 
respective
 
Ukrainian
 
representatives
 
to
 
bind
 
Ukraine
 
under
 
international
 
law.
(4)
 
Egypt
According
 
to
 
the
 
determination
 
by
 
the
 
OTP
 
concerning
 
the
 
communication
 
re-
ceived
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
Egypt:
On
 
13
 
December
 
2013,
 
lawyers
 
acting
 
on
 
behalf
 
of,
 
among
 
others,
 
the
 
Freedom
 
and
 
Justice
 
Party
 
( “ the
 
applicants” ),
 
submitted
 
to
 
the
 
Registrar
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
( “ICC”
 
or
 
the
 
“Court” )
 
documents
 
seeking
 
to
 
accept
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
ICC
 
pursuant
 
to
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
( “Statute” )
 
with
 
re-
spect
 
to
 
alleged
 
crimes
 
committed
 
on
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt
 
from
 
1
 
June
 
2013. 〔46〕
The
 
analysis
 
of
 
the
 
OTP
 
was
 
split
 
into
 
two
 
parts,
 
the
 
latter
 
labelled
 
“further
 
a-
nalysis” . 〔47〕
 
The
 
first
 
part
 
of
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
factual
 
and
 
legal
 
analysis
 
led
 
it
 
to
 
determine
 
that:
[􀆺]
 
the
 
purported
 
declaration
 
submitted
 
to
 
the
 
Registrar
 
on
 
13
 
December
 
2013,
 
was
 
not
 
submitted,
 
as
 
a
 
matter
 
of
 
international
 
law,
 
by
 
any
 
person
 
with
 
the
 
requisite
 
authority
 
or
 
bearing
 
“ full
 
powers”
 
to
 
represent
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt
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2015
 
OTP
 
Report,
 
above
 
n. 32,
 
para. 81.
OTP,
 
The
 
determination
 
of
 
the
 
Office
 
of
 
the
 
Prosecutor
 
on
 
the
 
communication
 
received
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
Egypt
 
(8
 
May
 
2014)
 
(www. legal-tools. org / doc / 2945cd / )
 
(OTP
 
Egypt
 
Determination) .
Ibid.
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
expressing
 
the
 
consent
 
of
 
that
 
State
 
to
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdic-
tion
 
by
 
the
 
Court. In
 
short,
 
the
 
applicants
 
lacked
 
locus
 
standi
 
to
 
seize
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
jurisdiction
 
pursuant
 
to
 
article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. 〔48〕
As
 
to
 
the
 
further
 
analysis,
 
the
 
OTP
 
first
 
affirmed
 
that
 
only
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
Security
 
Council
 
or
 
a
 
State
 
can
 
confer
 
jurisdiction
 
upon
 
the
 
Court
 
and
 
that
 
“the
 
Stat-
ute
 
provides
 
no
 
authority
 
for
 
it
 
to
 
adopt
 
a
 
method
 
to
 
define
 
the
 
term
 
‘State’
 
under
 
ar-
ticle
 
12 (3),
 
which
 
would
 
be
 
at
 
variance
 
with
 
that
 
established
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
ar-
ticle
 
12 (1). ” 〔49〕
 
The
 
OTP
 
then
 
confirmed
 
its
 
conclusion
 
that
 
the
 
applicants
 
lacked
 
both
 
the
 
requisite
 
authority
 
and
 
the
 
full
 
powers
 
to
 
represent
 
Egypt
 
both
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
on
 
which
 
the
 
declaration
 
was
 
signed
 
and
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
the
 
applicants
 
submitted
 
the
 
com-
munication
 
to
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar. 〔50〕
 
The
 
third
 
paragraph
 
of
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
further
 
a-
nalysis
 
turned
 
to
 
the
 
representatives
 
of
 
Egypt
 
before
 
the
 
United
 
Nations,
 
as
 
follows:
The
 
UN
 
Protocol
 
List
 
indicates
 
that
 
a
 
new
 
Head
 
of
 
State
 
(Mr. Adly
 
Mansour),
 
Head
 
of
 
Government
 
( Mr. Hazem
 
El
 
Beblawi )
 
and
 
Minister
 
of
 
Foreign
 
Affairs
 
(Mr. Nabil
 
Fahmy )
 
were
 
appointed
 
in
 
July
 
2013. Furthermore,
 
on
 
5
 
December
 
2013,
 
the
 
UN
 
General
 
Assembly
 
accepted
 
without
 
a
 
vote,
 
the
 
credentials
 
of
 
the
 
Egyptian
 
delegation,
 
led
 
by
 
current
 
Foreign
 
Minister,
 
Mr. Nabil
 
Fahmy. This
 
is
 
a
 
clear
 
indication
 
that
 
none
 
of
 
the
 
UN
 
Member
 
States
 
considered
 
representatives
 
of
 
Dr
 
Mohamed
 
Morsi
 
to
 
be
 
the
 
representatives
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt
 
at
 
the
 
UN
 
in
 
lieu
 
of
 
the
 
delegation
 
whose
 
credentials
 
were
 
recognized. Because
 
the
 
UN
 
Secretary - General
 
acts
 
as
 
depositary
 
of
 
the
 
Statute,
 
this
 
also
 
means
 
that,
 
from
 
July
 
2013
 
onwards,
 
Dr
 
Morsi
 
would
 
not
 
have
 
been
 
able
 
to
 
deposit
 
an
 
instrument
 
of
 
accession
 
to
 
the
 
Statute
 
on
 
behalf
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt,
 
had
 
he
 
sought
 
to
 
do
 
so. Although,
 
the
 
lawyers
 
for
 
the
 
applicants
 
argued
 
that
 
the
 
African
 
Union􀆳s
 
decision
 
to
 
suspend
 
Egypt􀆳s
 
participation
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Egypt
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n. 46.
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Egypt
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 46,
 
para. 1.
OTP
 
Egypt
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 46,
 
para. 2.
in
 
its
 
activities
 
indicated
 
that
 
there
 
has
 
been
 
a
 
collective
 
refusal
 
of
 
recognition
 
of
 
the
 
new
 
government,
 
which
 
took
 
power
 
on
 
3
 
July
 
2013,
 
the
 
Office
 
concluded
 
that
 
this
 
did
 
not
 
equate
 
to
 
continued
 
recognition
 
of
 
Dr
 
Morsi
 
as
 
the
 
Egyptian
 
Head
 
of
 
State. 〔51〕
The
 
OTP
 
could
 
have
 
opted
 
to
 
end
 
its
 
analysis
 
at
 
that
 
stage,
 
leaving
 
the
 
determi-
nation
 
to
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
General
 
Assembly,
 
as
 
it
 
did
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
the
 
declara-
tions
 
lodged
 
by
 
Palestine
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute. However,
 
the
 
fourth
 
paragraph
 
of
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
further
 
analysis
 
continued
 
as
 
follows:
In
 
accordance
 
with
 
the
 
legal
 
test
 
of
 
“ effective
 
control,”
 
the
 
entity
 
which
 
is
 
in
 
fact
 
in
 
control
 
of
 
a
 
State􀆳s
 
territory,
 
enjoys
 
the
 
habitual
 
obedience
 
of
 
the
 
bulk
 
of
 
the
 
population,
 
and
 
has
 
a
 
reasonable
 
expectancy
 
of
 
permanence,
 
is
 
recognized
 
as
 
the
 
government
 
of
 
that
 
State
 
under
 
international
 
law. Application
 
of
 
that
 
test,
 
on
 
both
 
the
 
date
 
that
 
the
 
purported
 
declaration
 
was
 
signed
 
and
 
the
 
date
 
it
 
was
 
submitted,
 
lead
 
to
 
the
 
conclusion
 
that
 
Dr
 
Morsi
 
was
 
no
 
longer
 
the
 
governmental
 
authority
 
with
 
the
 
legal
 
capacity
 
to
 
incur
 
new
 
international
 
legal
 
obligations
 
on
 
behalf
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
E-
gypt. The
 
information
 
available
 
indicates
 
that,
 
at
 
all
 
material
 
times,
 
the
 
applicants
 
did
 
not
 
exercise
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
any
 
part
 
of
 
Egyptian
 
territory,
 
including
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
the
 
declaration
 
was
 
signed. Nor
 
would
 
it
 
be
 
consistent
 
with
 
the
 
“ effective
 
con-
trol”
 
test
 
to
 
have
 
one
 
putative
 
authority
 
exercising
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
a
 
State,
 
and
 
the
 
other
 
competing
 
authority
 
retaining
 
international
 
treaty-making
 
capacity. 〔52〕
In
 
the
 
fifth
 
and
 
final
 
paragraph
 
of
 
its
 
further
 
analysis
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
commu-
nication
 
received
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
Egypt,
 
the
 
OTP
 
concluded
 
as
 
follows:
Based
 
on
 
these
 
considerations,
 
the
 
Office
 
has
 
determined
 
that
 
the
 
purport-
ed
 
declaration
 
submitted
 
to
 
the
 
Registrar
 
on
 
13
 
December
 
2013,
 
was
 
not
 
sub-
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OTP
 
Egypt
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 46,
 
para. 3
 
(footnotes
 
omitted) .
OTP
 
Egypt
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 46,
 
para. 4.
mitted,
 
as
 
a
 
matter
 
of
 
international
 
law,
 
by
 
any
 
person
 
with
 
the
 
requisite
 
author-
ity
 
or
 
bearing
 
“full
 
powers”
 
to
 
represent
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
expressing
 
the
 
consent
 
of
 
that
 
State
 
to
 
the
 
exercise
 
of
 
jurisdiction
 
by
 
the
 
Court. 〔53〕
3. The
 
“effective
 
control”
 
test
 
and
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
The
 
OTP
 
did
 
not
 
enter
 
into
 
an
 
effective
 
control
 
analysis
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
de-
clarations
 
lodged
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Article
 
12 ( 3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
by
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
Palestine,
 
or
 
Ukraine. Nor
 
did
 
the
 
respective
 
Pre-Trial
 
Chambers
 
and
 
Ap-
peals
 
Chamber
 
regarding
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire􀆳s
 
declaration
 
and
 
communiqués
 
confirming
 
ac-
ceptance
 
of
 
the
 
jurisdiction
 
of
 
the
 
Court. It
 
was
 
therefore
 
only
 
as
 
regards
 
the
 
commu-
nication
 
received
 
from
 
alleged
 
representatives
 
of
 
the
 
Arab
 
Republic
 
of
 
Egypt
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
discussed
 
whether
 
the
 
party
 
lodging
 
such
 
a
 
declaration
 
exercised
 
effective
 
con-
trol
 
over
 
the
 
State
 
territory
 
on
 
which
 
crimes
 
under
 
ICC
 
jurisdiction
 
were
 
alleged
 
to
 
have
 
taken
 
place. This
 
is
 
despite
 
the
 
fact
 
that,
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
the
 
State􀆳s
 
territory
 
was
 
arguably
 
contested
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
of
 
the
 
letters
 
sent
 
by
 
Mr
 
Alessane
 
Ouattara
 
to
 
ICC
 
officials
 
on
 
14
 
December
 
2010
 
and
 
4
 
May
 
2011. As
 
regards
 
Palestine,
 
when
 
its
 
representatives
 
lodged
 
its
 
two
 
declarations
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3),
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
the
 
territory
 
on
 
which
 
the
 
crimes
 
were
 
alleged
 
to
 
have
 
occurred
 
was
 
also
 
arguably
 
disputed. Finally,
 
in
 
respect
 
of
 
Ukraine,
 
as
 
noted
 
above,
 
the
 
Ukrainian
 
Parliament
 
acknowledged
 
that
 
Crimea
 
and
 
parts
 
of
 
parts
 
of
 
the
 
Donetsk
 
and
 
Luhansk
 
regions
 
were
 
occupied
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
it
 
transmitted
 
its
 
second
 
declaration
 
to
 
the
 
Court.
This
 
is
 
not
 
to
 
say
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
ought
 
to
 
have
 
entered
 
into
 
such
 
an
 
analysis
 
in
 
re-
spect
 
of
 
the
 
respective
 
declarations
 
lodged
 
by
 
Côte
 
D􀆳Ivoire,
 
Palestine,
 
and
 
Ukraine. Rather,
 
it
 
is
 
argued
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
correctly
 
limited
 
its
 
analysis
 
in
 
these
 
in-
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Egypt
 
Determination,
 
above
 
n. 46,
 
para. 5.
stances
 
to
 
the
 
determination
 
of
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
General
 
Assembly
 
and
 
to
 
whether
 
the
 
lodging
 
party
 
possessed
 
the
 
requisite
 
“full
 
powers”
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
lodging
 
State
 
un-
der
 
international
 
law.
3. 1
 
Application
 
of
 
the
 
test
 
by
 
the
 
OTP
 
in
 
relation
 
to
 
the
 
Egypt
 
communi-
cation
Michael
 
Kearney
 
has
 
argued,
 
replying
 
to
 
discussion
 
of
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
application
 
of
 
the
 
test
 
of
 
effective
 
control
 
by
 
Eugene
 
Kontorovich
 
that
 
an
 
effective
 
control
 
test
 
“does
 
not
 
exist
 
as
 
a
 
matter
 
of
 
international
 
law”
 
as
 
regards
 
the
 
recognition
 
of
 
govern-
ments. 〔54〕
 
Rather,
 
in
 
Kearney􀆳s
 
opinion,
 
government
 
recognition
 
is
 
better
 
viewed
 
a
 
political
 
process
 
and
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
application
 
of
 
an
 
effective
 
control
 
test
 
was
 
mis-
placed. 〔55〕
When
 
lawyers
 
acting
 
on
 
behalf
 
of,
 
among
 
others,
 
the
 
Freedom
 
and
 
Justice
 
Party
 
of
 
Dr
 
Mohamed
 
Morsi
 
attempted
 
to
 
lodge
 
a
 
declaration
 
with
 
the
 
ICC,
 
the
 
question
 
of
 
Egypt􀆳s
 
statehood
 
was
 
not
 
at
 
issue. The
 
OTP
 
therefore
 
need
 
not
 
have
 
made
 
recourse
 
to
 
a
 
test
 
of
 
effective
 
control,
 
which
 
has
 
been
 
explicitly
 
considered
 
by
 
some
 
States
 
in
 
the
 
context
 
of
 
their
 
recognition
 
of
 
States. For
 
example,
 
in
 
1976,
 
the
 
United
 
States
 
De-
partment
 
of
 
State
 
wrote
 
as
 
follows:
 
“ In
 
[ reaching
 
its
 
judgment
 
as
 
to
 
whether
 
to
 
recognise
 
another
 
an
 
entity
 
as
 
a
 
State],
 
the
 
United
 
States
 
has
 
traditionally
 
looked
 
to
 
the
 
establishment
 
of
 
certain
 
facts. These
 
facts
 
include
 
effective
 
control
 
over
 
a
 
clearly
 
defined
 
territory
 
[􀆺] ”. 〔56〕
Kearney
 
proposes
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
might
 
have
 
based
 
its
 
reference
 
to
 
“effective
 
con-
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Eugene
 
Kontorovich,
 
Guest
 
Post:
 
Effective
 
Control
 
and
 
Accepting
 
ICC
 
Jurisdiction
 
( 4
 
August
 
2014),
 
response
 
by
 
Michael
 
Kearney
 
dated
 
8. 04. 2014
 
at
 
12: 19
 
pm
 
EST
 
(www. opiniojuris. org / 2014 / 08 / 04 /
guest-post-effective-control-accepting-icc-jurisdiction / ) . The
 
author
 
has
 
verified
 
that
 
this
 
response
 
was
 
au-
thored
 
by
 
Dr
 
Michael
 
Kearney,
 
who
 
is,
 
at
 
the
 
time
 
of
 
writing,
 
Senior
 
Lecturer
 
in
 
Law
 
at
 
the
 
University
 
of
 
Sussex.
Ibid.
 
Eleanor
 
C. McDowell,
 
Contemporary
 
Practice
 
of
 
the
 
United
 
States
 
Relating
 
to
 
International
 
Law,
 
71
 
AJIL
 
(1977),
 
337,
 
citing
 
Notice
 
posted
 
in
 
Dept. of
 
State
 
Press
 
Relations
 
Office
 
on
 
Nov. 1,
 
1976,
 
in
 
response
 
to
 
a
 
question
 
raised
 
in
 
a
 
news
 
briefing
 
of
 
Oct. 22,
 
1976. See
 
also
 
Thomas
 
D. Grant,
 
The
 
Recognition
 
of
 
States:
 
Law
 
and
 
Practice
 
in
 
Debate
 
and
 
Evolution
 
(2007),
 
6
 
trol”
 
in
 
this
 
context
 
on
 
a
 
1980
 
decision
 
by
 
the
 
Government
 
of
 
the
 
United
 
Kingdom
 
to
 
no
 
longer
 
recognise
 
governments. 〔57〕
 
Instead,
 
such
 
status
 
was
 
to
 
be
 
inferred
 
from
 
re-
lations
 
between
 
the
 
UK
 
Government
 
and
 
the
 
new
 
regime. 〔58〕
 
According
 
to
 
Colin
 
Warbrick,
 
quoting
 
Lord
 
Carrington,
 
the
 
then
 
UK
 
Secretary
 
of
 
State
 
for
 
Foreign
 
and
 
Commonwealth
 
Affairs:
Among
 
the
 
factors
 
that
 
would
 
influence
 
the
 
quality
 
of
 
the
 
relations
 
with
 
the
 
new
 
authority
 
would
 
be
 
the
 
British
 
Government􀆳s
 
assessment
 
of:
 
“Whether
 
they
 
are
 
able
 
of
 
themselves
 
to
 
exercise
 
effective
 
control
 
of
 
the
 
territory
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
concerned
 
and
 
seem
 
likely
 
to
 
do
 
so”. The
 
thrust
 
of
 
the
 
statement
 
was
 
that
 
effectiveness
 
would
 
gen-
erally
 
be
 
a
 
necessary
 
precondition
 
for
 
governmental
 
status,
 
but
 
it
 
would
 
not
 
necessa-
rily
 
be
 
a
 
guarantee
 
of
 
‘normal
 
Government
 
to
 
Government’
 
relations. 〔59〕
Articles
 
2 (1) (c)
 
and
 
7 (1)
 
of
 
the
 
Vienna
 
Convention
 
on
 
the
 
Law
 
of
 
Trea-
ties,
 
to
 
which
 
the
 
OTP
 
refers
 
in
 
its
 
consideration
 
of
 
the
 
purported
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
de-
claration
 
lodged
 
by
 
Dr
 
Morsi􀆳s
 
representatives,
 
provide
 
as
 
follows:
Article
 
2
 
[􀆺]
1. For
 
the
 
purposes
 
of
 
the
 
present
 
Convention:
 
[􀆺]
(c)
 
“Full
 
powers”
 
means
 
a
 
document
 
emanating
 
from
 
the
 
competent
 
au-
thority
 
of
 
a
 
State
 
designating
 
a
 
person
 
or
 
persons
 
to
 
represent
 
the
 
State
 
for
 
nego-
tiating,
 
adopting
 
or
 
authenticating
 
the
 
text
 
of
 
a
 
treaty,
 
for
 
expressing
 
the
 
consent
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
to
 
be
 
bound
 
by
 
a
 
treaty,
 
or
 
for
 
accomplishing
 
any
 
other
 
act
 
with
 
re-
spect
 
to
 
a
 
treaty;
 
[􀆺]
Article
 
7
 
[􀆺]
1. A
 
person
 
is
 
considered
 
as
 
representing
 
a
 
State
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
adop-
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Kearney,
 
above
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Colin
 
Warbrick,
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Modern
 
LR
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Warbrick,
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n. 57,
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Warbrick,
 
above
 
n. 57,
 
92,
 
citing
 
HL
 
Deb
 
vol
 
408,
 
cols
 
1121- 1122,
 
28
 
April
 
1980
 
( Lord
 
Car-
rington) .
ting
 
or
 
authenticating
 
the
 
text
 
of
 
a
 
treaty
 
or
 
for
 
the
 
purpose
 
of
 
expressing
 
the
 
consent
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
to
 
be
 
bound
 
by
 
a
 
treaty
 
if:
(a)
 
He
 
produces
 
appropriate
 
full
 
powers;
 
or
(b)
 
It
 
appears
 
from
 
the
 
practice
 
of
 
the
 
States
 
concerned
 
or
 
from
 
other
 
cir-
cumstances
 
that
 
their
 
intention
 
was
 
to
 
consider
 
that
 
person
 
as
 
representing
 
the
 
State
 
for
 
such
 
purposes
 
and
 
to
 
dispense
 
with
 
full
 
powers. 〔60〕
Having
 
concluded
 
that,
 
under
 
international
 
law,
 
the
 
applicants
 
were
 
not
 
in
 
pos-
session
 
of
 
the
 
requisite
 
“full
 
powers”
 
to
 
act
 
on
 
behalf
 
of
 
the
 
State
 
of
 
Egypt,
 
“either
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
the
 
declaration
 
was
 
signed
 
or
 
on
 
the
 
date
 
it
 
was
 
submitted
 
to
 
the
 
Regis-
trar ”,〔61〕
 
the
 
OTP
 
was
 
not
 
required
 
to
 
enter
 
into
 
an
 
effective
 
control
 
analysis. Indeed,
 
by
 
applying
 
this
 
test
 
to
 
a
 
situation
 
in
 
which
 
statehood
 
was
 
by
 
no
 
means
 
contested,
 
the
 
OTP􀆳s
 
analysis
 
introduces
 
uncertainty
 
into
 
the
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declaration
 
process. Instead,
 
it
 
is
 
argued
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
ought
 
to
 
limit
 
its
 
consideration
 
in
 
this
 
context
 
to
 
determination
 
by
 
the
 
United
 
Nations.
The
 
present
 
author
 
finds
 
it
 
difficult
 
to
 
disagree
 
with
 
Michael
 
Kearney,
 
who,
 
contrasting
 
the
 
response
 
of
 
the
 
OTP
 
to
 
the
 
declarations
 
from
 
representatives
 
of
 
Pales-
tine
 
and
 
Egypt,
 
doubts
 
how
 
“on
 
the
 
one
 
hand
 
the
 
OTP
 
is
 
adamant
 
that
 
under
 
the
 
law
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute
 
it
 
cannot
 
establish
 
the
 
existence
 
of
 
a
 
state,
 
while
 
on
 
the
 
other
 
hand
 
it
 
is
 
fully
 
capable
 
of
 
engaging
 
with
 
the
 
far
 
murkier
 
question
 
of
 
establishing
 
the
 
existence
 
of
 
a
 
government”. 〔62〕
3. 2
 
State
 
cooperation
 
and
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
Notwithstanding,
 
should
 
the
 
OTP
 
follow
 
a
 
similar
 
approach
 
to
 
that
 
adopted
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
the
 
Egypt
 
communication
 
in
 
its
 
future
 
practice,
 
the
 
requirement
 
that
 
ac-
cepting
 
States
 
“ shall
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court”
 
in
 
accordance
 
with
 
Part
 
IX
 
of
 
the
 
374
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n. 46,
 
para. 2.
Kearney,
 
above
 
n. 54.
ICC
 
Statute
 
must
 
be
 
taken
 
into
 
consideration. The
 
capacity
 
to
 
provide
 
cooperation
 
is
 
essential
 
to
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
ability
 
to
 
effectively
 
investigate
 
and
 
prosecute
 
the
 
crimes
 
un-
der
 
its
 
jurisdiction,
 
whether
 
conferred
 
under
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
ICC
 
Statute
 
or
 
otherwise. Without
 
cooperation,
 
the
 
Court
 
is
 
unable
 
to,
 
among
 
other
 
things,
 
preserve
 
and
 
collect
 
evidence,
 
question
 
persons
 
under
 
investigation,
 
and
 
protect
 
victims
 
and
 
witnesses. 〔63〕
 
The
 
ability
 
to
 
cooperate
 
ought
 
therefore
 
to
 
be
 
factored
 
into
 
any
 
effec-
tive
 
control
 
analysis,
 
should
 
the
 
OTP
 
continue
 
to
 
follow
 
such
 
an
 
approach
 
in
 
the
 
fu-
ture. However,
 
this
 
is
 
not
 
to
 
say
 
that
 
the
 
OTP
 
should
 
persist
 
with
 
an
 
effective
 
control
 
analysis. As
 
argued
 
above,
 
the
 
OTP
 
ought
 
to
 
leave
 
such
 
questions
 
to
 
determination
 
by
 
the
 
United
 
Nations.
Further,
 
when
 
taking
 
into
 
account
 
the
 
lodging
 
State􀆳s
 
ability
 
to
 
cooperate,
 
it
 
ought
 
to
 
be
 
borne
 
in
 
mind
 
that
 
situations
 
in
 
which
 
cooperation
 
(and
 
indeed
 
effective
 
control)
 
might
 
be
 
lacking
 
include
 
those
 
where
 
action
 
by
 
the
 
Court
 
could
 
prove
 
vital
 
in
 
ending
 
impunity
 
for
 
crimes
 
under
 
its
 
jurisdiction. It
 
is
 
argued
 
that
 
this
 
considera-
tion,
 
in
 
turn,
 
provides
 
an
 
additional
 
argument
 
for
 
the
 
OTP
 
to
 
limit
 
its
 
determination
 
with
 
respect
 
to
 
future
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
declarations
 
to
 
whether
 
the
 
applicant
 
possesses
 
“full
 
powers”
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
lodging
 
State,
 
as
 
evidenced
 
by
 
the
 
determination
 
of
 
the
 
U-
nited
 
Nations
 
General
 
Assembly.
4. Conclusion
This
 
chapter
 
has
 
sought
 
to
 
argue
 
that
 
the
 
OTP,
 
when
 
considering
 
declarations
 
lodged
 
with
 
the
 
Court􀆳s
 
Registrar
 
according
 
to
 
Article
 
12 (3)
 
of
 
the
 
Rome
 
Statute,
 
ought
 
not
 
to
 
enter
 
into
 
an
 
analysis
 
of
 
whether
 
the
 
lodging
 
entity
 
exercises
 
“ effective
 
control”
 
over
 
territory. Rather,
 
the
 
Court
 
should
 
leave
 
any
 
determination
 
of
 
compe-
ting
 
governmental
 
claims
 
to
 
the
 
United
 
Nations
 
General
 
Assembly. This
 
body
 
is
 
a
 
much
 
more
 
suitable
 
entity
 
than
 
a
 
criminal
 
court
 
for
 
the
 
resolution
 
of
 
such
 
claims. The
 
OTP
 
should
 
limit
 
its
 
assessment
 
to
 
whether
 
the
 
applicants
 
possess
 
the
 
requisite
 
“ full
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(2016).
powers”
 
to
 
bind
 
the
 
State
 
they
 
seek
 
to
 
represent
 
in
 
lodging
 
the
 
ad
 
hoc
 
declaration. If,
 
however,
 
the
 
OTP
 
continues
 
to
 
apply
 
the
 
effective
 
control
 
test,
 
consideration
 
should
 
be
 
paid
 
to
 
the
 
ability
 
of
 
the
 
lodging
 
party
 
to
 
cooperate
 
with
 
the
 
Court,
 
a
 
crucial
 
re-
quirement
 
enabling
 
the
 
fulfilment
 
of
 
its
 
mandate.
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